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1. Introduction 
 
 
“Public engagement”, “involvement” and “dialogue” have become important themes in 
nanotechnology policy discourses. While several social scientists from science and 
technology studies (STS) advocate “upstream public engagement” (Wilson and Willis, 
2004; Wynne, 2001, 2003a), this notion has been introduced in official discourse, 
especially in the United Kingdom (Royal Society, 2004), and also at the European level. 
In a 2004 document, the European Union calls for “dialogue” with the public (European 
Union, 2004), while the “Science and Society” part of the 6th European research and 
development framework program funds projects to explore the ways to “involve citizens 
in dialogue and participation”1. In France, official political statements about public 
participation in nanotechnology remain rare. However Prime Minister de Villepin asked 
in May 2005 for a “national public debate”2, and numerous public debates were held in 
the following years about the societal implications of nanotechnology. 
In the following, I will use the notion of “public engagement” in a broader sense, as 
long as it implies two-way exchanges between the public and those who have 
knowledge of or power over the particular issues at stake. Whenever actors characterize 
a particular mechanism as public “participation”, “involvement”, “dialogue” or 
                                                 
1  Science and Society program, Directorate-General for Research, 
http://ec.europa.eu/research/science-society/science-governance/science-governance_en.html 
2  Speech of the Prime Minister given for the General Estates of Firms and Sustainable 
Development, May 31, 2005. 
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“engagement”, I will consider it as object of study. Brian Wynne (2003) makes clear 
that public engagement is not value-neutral. By focusing on risks, it often constructs a 
particular “public” afraid of technological developments and unable to make good 
decisions without scientific inputs. Therefore the notion of the “public” itself should not 
be considered un-problematic, but rather a part of what is defined through the design, 
use and critique of participatory mechanisms. 
The notion of public engagement can be granted different meanings. A reason for that is 
that different motivations can underlie a decision or a statement in favour of public 
engagement. Fiorino (1990) proposes three motivations for public participation in 
science and technology: participation is good in itself (normative reason), it is more 
efficient as it has a legitimizing effect (instrumental reason), and it produces better end-
products (substantive reason). These three motivations can be present simultaneously 
about the same mechanism, which may lead to certain confusion about what public 
engagement means for the actors that sponsor or advocate them. Indeed, in the case of 
nanotechnology, the official uptake of the notion of “public engagement in 
nanotechnology” does not go without “confusion and ambiguity” as MacNaghten et al. 
state (2005). One of the misunderstandings that these authors point to relates to 
projected “impacts” of nanotechnology: although it is not the purpose of upstream 
public engagement to predict them, the references to this notion are numerous in official 
documents.  
These accounts make clear that the notion of “public engagement in nanotechnology’ 
can be understood differently among various actors. My aim is here to go one step 
further in the analysis of public engagement by studying more extensively different 
visions of public engagement in nanotechnology articulated not only by officials and 
social scientists, but also by activists. I am interested in this paper in the different ways 
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through which officials, scientists, activists and social scientists give meaning to public 
engagement through the design, the use and the critique of particular mechanisms.  
This paper is based on an empirical study, and will consider the city of Grenoble as 
example. Grenoble is a city in the French Alps where nanotechnology research projects 
are led, and have been facing opposition from activist groups. Focusing on the design, 
use and critique of the public engagement mechanisms that have been attempted in 
Grenoble, I will show how various groups of actors articulate different visions of public 
engagement, which can even be in some cases a rejection of it. Indeed, the extension of 
the analysis to anti-nanotechnology activism will lead to analyze an extreme vision of 
public engagement that defines it as mere alienation.  
The analysis of public engagement will be led at two levels. First, the framing of the 
issues at stake will be studied. “Nanotechnology” does not represent the same notion for 
all the actors involve, and this contributes to create differences in the understanding of 
public engagement. The second level of analysis will be the definition of the role of the 
citizen in Grenoble. Sponsoring, organizing, criticizing and participating in a particular 
public engagement mechanism are ways to articulate visions of how the citizen should 
engage in science policy. Through these two levels of analysis, I will thus demonstrate 
that the different meanings granted to public engagement are strongly connected to 
competing definitions of nanotechnology on the one hand, and of citizenship on the 
other. Therefore each vision of public engagement is related to a particular model of 
understanding of what nanotechnology issues are and how the citizen should engage in 
the governance of science and technology. 
The notion of “framing” nanotechnology and citizenship should be explained. In this 
paper, I will explore the strategies in discourses and practices through which 
nanotechnology and citizenship are assigned specific meaning. Communication scholars 
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have been stressing the need to study the framing of nanotechnology for science 
communication matters (Scheufele, 2006; Nisbet and Mooney, 2007)3. Their position 
implies that nanotechnology is a reality that can be effectively communicated if 
“framed” in ways appropriate to specific publics. On the contrary, I claim that 
nanotechnology and citizenship are categories that are constructed through discourses 
and practices that engage human and material actors, thus becoming part of public 
discourse (Hajer, 1995; Fischer, 2000). This study can be seen in the same line as 
previous STS works that focused on biotechnology (Gottweis, 1998; Jasanoff, 2005). 
These remarks apply to what I called “visions” of public engagement. The term “vision” 
is not to be understood as if public engagement existed in a neutral, objective fashion 
that would be distorted by those who try to implement or critique it. Rather, a vision of 
public engagement is for me a construction of a specific public engagement.  
 
In the following, I will first describe the situation in Grenoble, and introduce the public 
engagement mechanisms that were attempted. Then I will present three competing 
visions of public engagement. Articulated by scientists and officials, activists, and social 
scientists, these three ways of understanding public engagement define differently its 
role in science and technology governance– one of them even rejects it. They are related 
to particular models for the definition of nanotechnology issues and the engagement of 
the citizen in science policy. I will conclude with some implications for the role of 
social science (and especially science and technology studies) in public engagement in 
nanotechnology. 
 
                                                 
3  Scheufele (1999) provides an overview of the literature on the topic, which focuses on “frames” 
as cause or consequence of individual or group action in a linear fashion. I prefer focusing on “framing” 
to stress the dynamic process (in a coproductionist way) 
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2. Nanotechnology in Grenoble: research projects, activism and a need for 
dialogue 
 
a. Nanotechnology projects in Grenoble and social opposition 
 
Nanotechnology projects in Grenoble have roots in scientific activities in the 
Commissariat à l’Energie Atomique (CEA), and more precisely in a CEA laboratory 
called LETI, specialized in solid-state physics and electromagnetics (Jacq, 1996; Pestre, 
1991). CEA started to develop research activities in biotechnology and nano-electronics 
in the late 90s. In the same time, contacts between CEA-LETI, engineering schools and 
local administrations started to establish a joint research center. CEA and La Metro, the 
Grenoble metropolitan area council, signed the agreement launching the Minatec project 
in January 2002. The objectives of Minatec were “to become Europe's top centre for 
innovation and expertise in micro and nanotechnology”4 by bringing together research 
activities in nano-electronics and nano-biotechnology (especially biochips 
development). Parallel to that, the Joseph-Fourier University, the largest higher 
education institution in Grenoble, started the Biopolis project in 2001 to host newly 
created companies from universities and research institutions. This incubator received 
also funding from La Metro and opened in fall 2002. The Nanobio project was also 
launched in 2001 by CEA and the Joseph-Fourier University, with the financial support 
from local authorities. Nanobio, which is part of the European Network Nano2Life, 
brings together engineers, physicists and biologists and has a broad portfolio of 
activities, from bio-imaging and bio-detection to surface chemistry.  
Technological projects in Grenoble faced opposition from a group of activists since 
                                                 
4  Lettre Minatec no.1, Jan.2001 (my translation) 
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2001. A poster against Biopolis was found in Grenoble in October 2001; it was soon 
followed by numerous texts and leaflets that attacked Biopolis, Nanobio and the 
Minatec projects. The opposition has been led by a group called Pièces et main 
d’oeuvre (PMO). Originally composed of no more than a few activists, PMO has no 
centralized structure. Activists from other groups can join temporarily or be loosely 
affiliated. PMO members tend to be highly educated and some of them have scientific 
or engineering background5. 
Other groups in Grenoble, mostly with leftist and anti-globalization agenda, intervene in 
anti-nanotechnology contestation. When doing so, they often refer to PMO, which can 
be regarded as the most influential group in anti-nanotechnology critique in Grenoble. 
The structure of activists’ activities in Grenoble relies strongly on the Internet. For 
instance, the Grenoble branch of Indymedia6 is a privileged locus for the gathering and 
circulation of information about the opposition against scientific research.  
 
Two streams of criticism are present in PMO’s texts7. They are closely associated in the 
activists’ argumentation, yet I separate them for analytical clarity. First, PMO 
denounces a particular model of economic development, seen as typical of Grenoble, in 
which science, industry and local administrations have close links and decisions are 
made without consulting the population. Characteristic of this model is for PMO 
activists the case of the major of Grenoble, who holds a PhD in nuclear physics and 
used to work as research engineer for CEA. The second stream of criticisms 
                                                 
5  PMO is reluctant to give information about the identity of its members.  These general remarks 
come from interviews with PMO members (January 15 and January 17, 2007), as well as a radio 
broadcasting (“Nanotechnologies: refus de modernité ou d’inhumanité”, France Inter, June 2, 2006). 
6  Indymedia Grenoble is part of a global network (Independent Media Center, Indymedia) created 
after the demonstrations in Seattle in 1999 and devoted to independent information on an anti-
globalization agenda (Morris, 2004). 
7  Most of PMO’s texts are published on the Internet (www.piecesetmaindoeuvre.com/). Others 
circulate among members (some of them were provided to this paper’s author by the activists). 
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concentrates on nanotechnology itself. Nanotechnology is seen as a way to ensure 
control on the human being through RFID techniques and its alliance with 
biotechnology, as well as a source of technologies for military application. Indeed, 
contracts between CEA and the Direction Générale de l’Armement (DGA, General 
Direction for Armaments) ensure an “active cooperation”8 between the two in the 
nanochip domain. Nanochips, military applications, manufacturing at the atomic scale 
are invoked as example of the control of nature and human beings that would be the 
purpose of nanotechnology research. Linking ironically nanotechnology to 
biotechnology in the same objectives of control of the human being, the opponents 
coined the term nécrotechnologies to describe the lethal consequences of converging 
technologies. Nécrotechnologies is a synonym for program of control, another 
expression they use extensively.  The labelling of nanotechnology as program of control 
allows PMO to bring together the two themes of its criticisms: the expression refers to 
the control that technocracy and economic interests exercise over society, and to the 
control over nature and human beings that underlies nanotechnology research. 
 
b. Engaging public dialogue? 
 
The construction work of the buildings that would host Minatec began in 2002. 
Contestation kept growing, still focusing on the two main issues of contestation of a 
model of development and rejection of nanotechnology. In 2003, in the same time that 
scientists and industrialists were invited to discuss about future partnerships in the so-
called “Minatec meetings”, PMO organized movie projections and discussions about 
                                                 
8  Lettre Minatec no.5, July 2003. 
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nanotechnology in Grenoble and called them “Minatoc meetings”9. Activists organized 
various kinds of demonstrations on the Minatec construction site. For instance, a few of 
them occupied a crane for a day in December 2004; pictures were seen in the local 
newspaper and mentioned in national periodicals.  
A need for “public dialogue” began to be formulated in local administration’s discourse 
and it manifested itself clearly at the Forum Science et Démocratie (Science and 
Democracy Forum), described by a member of the municipal majority as “the first 
participatory mechanism in science in Grenoble”10. Organized by La Metro and held in 
June 2005, the Forum was a two-day event, open to the public, during which scientists, 
social scientists, local administrators and representatives of environmental associations 
discussed themes like “science and ethics” or “the response to social demand”, and 
answered questions from the public. The president of La Metro, said in the local 
newspaper that the Forum was an “open and participatory event” and an opportunity to 
have a “contradictory debate”. He concluded by saying: “and then everybody makes up 
his mind”, which the activists interpreted as an acknowledgement that there would be no 
link to political decision-making11.  
Indeed, the Forum raised very general points and led to no concrete decision by La 
Metro. Some among those who criticized the Forum were acknowledged by the 
organizers and had the possibility to write a few lines at the end of the report of the 
event. These critics were political opponents from ecologist and far-left parties who 
blamed La Metro for having waited too long before organizing a public event like the 
Forum. PMO members were not invited to participate along other associations and 
remained unacknowledged opponents although they strongly criticized the Forum of 
                                                 
9  In French, “toc” is slang for “junk”. 
10  Interview with a Grenoble city councillor, in charge of new technologies, January 18, 2007. 
11  PMO, “Migaud recrute un mercernaire”, published online in May 2005, 
www.piecesetmaindoeuvre.com/spip.php?page=resume&id_article=39 
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being a “parody of democracy”12. 
The Forum concluded by saying that the “general public”13 should be involved in 
technology policy, but did not consider how. The meanings granted to the “engagement 
of the public” differed greatly according to the speakers, ranging from conveying 
information to active participation in the decision-making process about the nature of 
research projects. Following the Forum, La Metro ordered a report to a group of Science 
and Technology Studies (STS) scholars led by Pierre-Benoit Joly. They were asked to 
do a comparative review of public participatory mechanisms in technology and make 
recommendations. The report (Joly, 2005) was released in September 2005 and 
recommended to organize a citizen conference to decide about the future of 
nanotechnology projects in Grenoble. Within the context of the decisions already made, 
it identified the possibility of public intervention, in terms of research orientation and 
funding, which could have been led, for example, in the case of the second phase of the 
Nanobio project. 
The Forum and the commission of the Joly report can be interpreted as signs of the 
growing role of public engagement in official nanotechnology discourses in the 
Grenoble area. They were followed by another attempt sponsored by the European 
Union as part of the Nanodialogue project. The Grenoble part of this project was 
coordinated by the Centre de Communication Scientifique, Technique et Industrielle 
(CCSTI), a science communication agency funded by the Grenoble municipality. The 
CCSTI organized a “citizen dialogue” in the Grenoble area in March 2006 to “identify 
social concerns” and “bring them up to the European Commission”14. As the Forum, 
the “citizen dialogue” formulated a demand for information but did not consider the 
                                                 
12  Ibid. 
13  Concluding intervention of the president of La Metro, June 17, 2005. 
14  This expression is used by CCSTI in Nanodialogue press release (www.ccsti-
grenoble.org/download/CP_nanodialogue.pdf ). This idea of two-way dialogue is part and parcel of the 
statement of the overall Nanodialogue  project (http://www.nanodialogue.org/) 
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possibility of a deeper public implication. It received little media coverage and attention 
from officials, although some of them mention it as a “step in the good direction”15. 
The move of local administrations to the acknowledgment of the need to answer social 
concerns did not satisfy the activists. PMO criticized the Forum, the Joly report and 
Nanodialogue, claiming that the purpose was the “social acceptability” of 
nanotechnology16. They blamed the “appearance of democracy”17: they did not see how 
La Metro or CEA would change anything in the Minatec project since the major 
decisions were already made. The Joly report was described as an attempt to sell 
nanotechnology through particular social science disciplines. In December 2005, six 
months before the opening of Minatec, the Opposition Grenobloise aux 
Nécrotechnologies (Grenoble Opposition to Nécrotechnology) was constituted to fight 
against “servile sciences for totalitarian industries”18. This initially small group 
managed to organize counter-events (such as movie projections and discussions in cafes 
in the Grenoble area) and finally a 1000 people demonstration on June 2, 2006, the day 
of Minatec opening. 
To the credit of the activists’ arguments, La Metro has not followed the 
recommendations of the Joly report, has not organized a citizen conference so far, and 
this has not been mentioned as a future project. However it ordered and sponsored 
Nanoviv, a series of public debates organized in Grenoble by Vivagora, which is an 
association led by a small group of former scientific journalists. Vivagora is devoted to 
the organization of public debates, and is strongly influenced by STS academic works. 
                                                 
15  Interview with a Grenoble metropolitan area councillor, January 17, 2007 
16  PMO, “La part du feu”, published online in November 2005, 
www.piecesetmaindoeuvre.com/IMG/pdf/La_part_du_feu.pdf 
17  Ibid. 
18  Statement of the Opposition Grenobloise aux Nécrotechnologies, published on OGN website. 
This website does not exist anymore as the group was intended to be temporary. As PMO members stated 
in interviews, this choice was made because activists “do not seek recognition” and want to stay 
anonymous. As such, the fact that OGN was a temporary group is part of the activists search for interest-
free positions. This latter argument will be developed in part 2. 
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The objectives of Nanoviv were the “identification of the actors and stakes”, and the 
“formulation of recommendations for policy-makers”19. The method employed sought 
to reach a consensus at the end of each debate on needed regulations. Each of the 
debates focused on a particular theme (e.g., “nanomaterials and toxicology” or 
“nanoscience and application to medicine”), and scientists, social scientists, politicians 
and administrators were invited. PMO was invited by the organizers as well, but refused 
to join, arguing that Nanoviv was a mere communication device, unable to question 
major decisions20. The invitation was interpreted as an attempt made by officials to 
“recruit” the activists, just as they had “recruited” social scientists such as Pierre-Benoît 
Joly21. 
Nanoviv started in summer 2006 and ended in December 2006, after six public debates. 
Activists have been continuously blaming these events for trying to regulate “impacts” 
without contesting nanotechnology projects themselves22. For them, these debates “do 
not even consider the possibility of refusing nanotechnology research”23 and as such, 
they are biased in favour of technological development. On the other hand, several 
scientists criticized the Nanoviv debates of being biased the other way; they were for 
them “exaggeratedly suspicious”24. Both sides agreed in saying that Vivagora was 
“selling public debates”25 and as such, was trying to create a debate where there should 
not necessarily be one (position of the scientists) or was compromising with officials to 
get a contract (position of the activists). Officials for their part were divided: some 
                                                 
19  Nanoviv presentation leaflet. Vivagora, September 2006. 
20  PMO, “Et maintenant le tsunami de la communication”, published online in October 2006, 
www.piecesetmaindoeuvre.com/spip.php?page=resume&id_article=93 
21  PMO, “La Métro tente de recuter PMO !”, published online in April 2006 
www.piecesetmaindoeuvre.com/spip.php?page=resume&id_article=56 
22  PMO, “Et maintenant le tsunami de la communication” 
23  Ibid. 
24  The theme of the “exaggeratedly suspicious armosphere” was raised in interviews by scientists 
and city councillors 
25  The same expression – “selling public debates”- was used by activists, scientists and officials in 
interviews. I will return to this similarity in the end of the paper. 
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criticized the suspicious atmosphere, whereas others saw Nanoviv as a good way to 
ensure public trust. However few of them came to the debates and the operational 
character of the outcome remains unclear at the time of writing. So far, the 
recommendations written at the end of the debate series have not led to political uptake. 
 
3. Three visions of public engagement 
 
Public engagement has been talked about in Grenoble, and several public engagement 
mechanisms were implemented. Yet everyone in Grenoble would agree that none of 
these mechanisms influenced the decisions related to technology about research 
priorities or funding policy of local administrations. Thus the Grenoble example can be 
seen as another account on difficulties encountered to design empowering public 
participatory attempts26. 
Although the particular features of each event could be detailed27, I will analyze the 
failure to design empowering participatory events by making clear that different visions 
of public engagement compete between each other in Grenoble, not only that of officials 
and social scientists, but also that of the activists.  
These competing understandings of public engagement are articulated through the use, 
the design or the critique of attempted participatory mechanisms. They are related to 
different framings of the issue at stake – namely nanotechnology research, but also 
different definitions of the role of the citizen in the relationships between science and 
policy. I will detail the visions of public engagement along these two levels of analysis, 
and thus define them as “models” for the understanding of both nanotechnology and the 
                                                 
26  Fung and Wright (2003) provide interesting examples. 
27  For examples in France, see Blanc (1999) about participation of inhabitants in urban planning 
policy, and Joly and Marris (1999) about a citizen conference about GMOs. In both cases, the authors 
point at the difficulty encountered to ensure effective empowerment through the analysis of the 
relationships between actors during particular participatory events. 
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role of the citizen in science and technology governance.  
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a. The enlightenment model. 
 
Except for Nanodialogue funded by the European Union, the attempts made in 
Grenoble to engage the public were directly sponsored by local administrations: the city 
council, the Rhone-Alpes region and the Grenoble metropolitan area council, La Metro, 
the latter being the most involved. Although Nanodialogue received almost no attention 
by local officials, the 2005 Forum led to the order of the Joly report by La Metro, which 
was followed by the Nanoviv debate series, strongly supported by La Metro. This 
support was financial, but has also other dimensions. For instance, scientists responsible 
for nanotechnology research programs were directly asked to participate by local 
officials28. The Joly report and the participatory attempts have led officials to recognize 
that there had been a lack of communication about the ways local administrations 
partner with CEA, and therefore have reinforced the discourse about the necessary 
“transparency”29 of the science-related decisions. Thus officials continue to stress the 
need to pursue the dialogue with the public, in which “every concern should receive an 
answer”30. This vision of public engagement that sees it as an opportunity for the public 
to get answers to its concerns is linked with a particular framing of the issues at stake.  
Public engagement occurs in a context where ground decisions are made. They are 
fundamental decisions that, for local officials, are not politically loaded, and are needed 
to be made to ensure local development in the Grenoble area. Indeed, officials in the 
Grenoble area characterize nanotechnology research as a powerful engine for economic 
development, both local and national. That justifies the public investment policy 
adopted by La Metro. This framing of nanotechnology as a leveraging tool for growth 
                                                 
28  Interview with the person in charge of the Nanobio project for the Joseph-Fourier University, 
January 12, 2007 
29  See for instance the interview of Michel Destot, mayor of Grenoble, in “Réalités, Prévention”, 
published by INRS (National Institute for Research and Safety),  n°9, October 2005. 
30  Interview with a councillor at La Metro, January 17, 2006. 
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implies that initial public investment decisions cannot be challenged, but it also goes 
with the recognition of the possibility of “social impacts” that have to be taken into 
account: these are “ethical concerns” and “risks issues”. The former is to be dealt with 
by ethics committees, the work of which being a tool that has to be integrated in a 
process. For the latter, it is necessary to focus on definite products (for instance various 
types of nanomaterials) and evaluate their environmental impacts in the context of 
particular production sites (for instance by studying the risk of materials release in the 
environment in case of flooding). Either ethical and risk issues are to be dealt with by 
particular expert knowledge. Some ethicists and social scientists “are well-recognized 
experts to address these issues” as the president of La Metro stated at the Forum. This 
framing does not question the rationality of technical, economic, social or ethical 
expertise, and sees it as the only way to address nanotechnology-related issues.  
The governance model they articulate in Grenoble in response to anti-nanotechnology 
activism does not contest the dual model of political and technical delegations (Callon 
et al., 2001) but goes beyond it. This renewed delegatory model seeks to make the 
technical delegation clearer. The public is invited to understand the full process that 
leads to expert decisions, can ask questions and raise concerns during dialogues. Public 
engagement is thus a way to organize these dialogues, and as such a means to enlighten 
the public. The “public” in this “enlightenment model” should be as broad as possible, 
and comprise every citizen, since “modern society needs a real trust in progress, a 
technological, social and societal progress that we have to accompany collectively”31. 
For all technical matters (whether scientific, economic, ethical or social), the citizen 
must let experts make the decisions. Yet in the extended delegatory model, he or she is 
                                                 
31  “Grenoble, symbole du débat public et de la confiance dans le progrès scientifique”, Grenoble 
mayor’s blog, published online on June 2, 2006. The title of this text alone (“Grenoble, symbol of public 
debate and of trust in scientific progress”) is a good illustration of the enlightenment model. 
http://micheldestot.blogs.com/le_blog_de_michel_destot/innovation/index.html 
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able to understand it and can give his or her agreement. The question of what would 
happen if the expert decision were not agreed is not even mentioned, and cannot be, 
since the enlightenment model sees the scientific and economic rationalities as 
unambiguous ways to make decision, and more than that, to construct the public good 
independently from “ideological biases”, the first of which being activism. Therefore, 
either the citizen accepts to be enlightened and, as a consequence, agrees with the 
definitions of the issues at stake and the expert delegations, or he or she refuses for 
reasons that can be nothing but ideological. 
This vision of the rationality of the decision and the enlightenment of the citizen is 
articulated in response to PMO opposition. Its consequence is the labelling of PMO 
activism as irrational. The contestation of the framing of nanotechnology in terms of 
program of economic development and set of products with possible impacts leads to 
the contestation of the validity of rational arguments, whether economic (about the 
impact on competitiveness or employment) or scientific (about the risks of 
nanoparticule release for example). This contestation cannot be accepted, since the 
assumption that these arguments refer to an unambiguous reality is central to the 
stability of the enlightenment model. In the vision of public engagement that this model 
articulates, it is mere ideology that prevents activists from seeing rationality where it 
lies. 
 
b. The critical inquiry model. 
 
PMO, the most vocal of the activist groups, has continuously criticized public 
engagement of being mere alienation to ensure social acceptability. The framing of the 
issues at stake in public engagement as articulated by the officials receives strong 
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criticisms. Instead of seeing nanotechnology as a powerful engine for economic 
development, activists describe it as another example after nuclear energy32 of strong 
connections between academic research, local administrations, industries and defence 
research institutions, which constitute the so-called techno-gratin, “techno top-brass” in 
PMO’s slang. Such connections produce undemocratic decisions as the public is not 
involved and not even informed. The evaluation of the impacts of specific products is 
not accepted either. It leaves no room for the global contestation of the program of 
control that, according to PMO, underlies nanotechnology research. Public engagement 
as led in Grenoble is therefore seen as a way to ensure that these descriptions of 
nanotechnology will not be taken into account. 
That no participatory mechanism has led to political decision has reinforced the critique 
of the undemocratic process. A sign of this is the fact that environmental or anti-
globalization groups that were originally silent about nanotechnology research have 
become more critical in Grenoble33. However, even if the recommendations released at 
the end of the Nanoviv debate series had been seriously integrated in regulatory 
statements, PMO would probably not have changed its critical position. For the 
activists, public engagement is not accepted for a number of reasons. First, it is not a 
valuable information provider but a “communication tool”34, biased in favour of the 
“official propaganda”35. The multiple interests prevent public engagement from 
providing trustful information. Politicians want to be re-elected, scientists want to 
continue their research and make money from it through partnerships with industry, 
NGOs like Vivagora “sell public debates”, and STS scholars like Pierre-Benoit Joly are 
                                                 
32  Activism again nuclear energy has been particularly vocal in the Grenoble area (Touraine, 
1980). Leading members of PMO come from anti-nuclear energy groups. 
33  For example, the anti-globalization group ATTAC had been hardly active about nanotechnology 
until 2006, when it refused to participate in the Nanoviv debate series with arguments very similar to 
PMO’s.  
34  See, among many other examples, “Et maintenant, le tsunami de la communication” 
35  Ibid. 
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“mercenaries”36 who sell their expertise. The multiple ties that attach actors with 
various interests not only prevent public engagement mechanisms from providing any 
trustful information, but they also prevent from designing any public engagement 
mechanism that would be accepted by activists.  
The second reason why PMO will not accept public engagement lies in its fight for a 
certain purity of the social and political categories: science should not interfere with 
industry, politicians should not follow electoral strategies and even less economic 
interests, environmental groups should fight for the environment without compromising 
themselves through negotiations. New forms of organization or cross-boundary 
relationships cannot be accepted as they blur central distinctions, for instance between 
public good and private interest, or economy and science. Thus the notion of hybrid 
forum as basis for public engagement (Callon, 2003), which is central in the 
recommendations of the Joly report and used as references by Vivagora, cannot be 
accepted by PMO. 
The last reason for PMO to reject public engagement is linked to the way activists see 
the role of the citizen in relation to science and technology. PMO’s actions revolve 
around the notion of critical inquiry37: activists explore the connections between 
science and policy and illuminate the hidden links that lead to particular political 
decisions from an independent viewpoint that would be the one of every “simple 
citizen”. The latter expression is used to sign PMO texts, which are careful analysis of 
the relationships between local politics, scientific research and industrial investments. 
PMO’s anonymous identity of “simple citizen”, which is strongly criticized by scientists 
and officials and labelled “undemocratic”, is a way to construct the independent citizen 
                                                 
36  PMO, “Migaud recrute un mercernaire”, published online in May 2005, 
www.piecesetmaindoeuvre.com/spip.php?page=resume&id_article=39 
37   The following paragraph is based on two interviews with anonymous PMO members (January 
15 and January 17, 2007) and on an unpublished text entitled “Pour l’enquête critique” (For critical 
inquiry). 
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able to critique the existing political situation of the Grenoble area. His or her duty is to 
reveal where contestable interests lie and to critique the mechanisms that are designed 
to make them acceptable. Activists labelled themselves “simple citizens” and expect the 
general public to be so. “Investigate by yourself” claims a leaflet from an activist group 
close to PMO: every citizen should engage in critical inquiry. Therefore participating in 
a public engagement mechanism, even in its most empowered sense, will never be 
accepted since it contradicts the independent position, “from nowhere” that activists 
want to adopt. 
In a work he did partly in Grenoble, Touraine (1980) pointed at the difficulty 
encountered by anti-nuclear energy groups (in which some nowadays PMO members 
were active) to propose an alternative political model for the relationships of science 
and society. Indeed, PMO does not propose any political model for the integration of 
nanotechnology in society, but is far from being only an anti-nanotechnology group 
limited to cultural rejection. It defines a particular role for the citizen that is not limited 
to the critique of technology itself but encompasses the whole set of relationships 
between science and policy. 
 
c. The constructivist model. 
 
Another vision of public engagement is articulated in Grenoble, first of all through the 
interventions of STS scholars during the Forum, then in the Joly report and finally by 
Vivagora, the NGO in charge of the organization of the Nanoviv debate series. This 
vision defines public engagement as a transformation of the relationships between 
science and the public. It proposes a “collective management”38 of emerging 
                                                 
38  Interview with the general delegate of Vivagora, September 1, 2006. 
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technologies that will lead to construct regulatory frameworks and orientate research 
trajectories. The mechanisms suggested or actually designed are citizen conferences or 
public debates that are expected to produce recommendations, and eventually changes 
in political and technical decision-making. 
This vision of public engagement in the Grenoble context implies a deconstruction of 
nanotechnology research into several projects. For each of them, the room for public 
action needs to be identified for the citizen to be able to give his or her inputs, in terms 
of research orientations or funding decisions. Thus nanotechnology in Grenoble is 
framed neither as a set of products nor as a global program of control, but as several 
projects connecting political decisions and technological choices, some of them 
irreversible and others still open. Locating the possibility for public intervention in these 
projects is one of the main issues of public engagement as understood in the 
constructivist vision. 
Public engagement understood as such supposes that each participant recognizes his 
interests and presents them during a discussion, by reflecting upon his own 
subjectivities constructed by his multiple attachments (Gomart and Hennion, 1998). The 
public should represent the variety of competing opinions, thus including the activists 
(although they have continuously refused to participate). Contrary to the visions 
articulated by the officials or the activists, not all citizens are supposed to be part of the 
process, but rather those willing to be involved and interested enough in science and 
technology to participate in a public debate, to be member of a citizen panel or to be in 
the audience of a citizen conference. In other terms, the goal is not to lead the whole 
society to enlightenment, nor to transform each citizen into a careful analyst of 
unacceptable relationships between science, politics and the market, but to empower 
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those who will help constructing a more robust socio-technical system39. 
For this vision of public engagement to be implemented as it is intended to be, the 
support of political power is needed. However, as we saw, local administrations did not 
follow the recommendations of the Joly report and how they will use those formulated 
after Nanoviv is extremely unclear. On the other hand, PMO has continuously blamed 
the social scientists’ position. Indeed, both groups have difficulty accepting public 
engagement as understood by STS scholars. For scientists and officials, it is needed as 
enlightenment tool to ensure a large social consensus on the technical and economic 
decisions, but it could not change the decision-making process since scientific and 
economic rationalities are seen as unique. The enlightened citizen cannot change the 
framing of nanotechnology in terms of engine for economic development with impacts 
that have to be evaluated by experts. For activists, the fact that major decisions are 
already made discredits public engagement in Grenoble. But more than that, the very 
notion of public engagement as defined by STS scholars can not be accepted by PMO, 
as it blurs the boundary between science and politics. Therefore, activists blame social 
scientists for being nothing but an attempt to legitimize decisions that mix science, 
politics, economy and possibly other domains (like the defence industry) without 
questioning the official vision of nanotechnology. 
 
4. Synthesis and concluding remarks 
 
The three visions of public engagement are summarized in the following table. The first 
two columns are the two levels of analysis that were used.  
                                                 
39  See the notion of concerned group (Callon et al., 2001), and public formed around an issue that 
comes into being (Marres, 2005) 
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  Framing of the issues at stake: nanotechnology 
Definition of the role 
of the citizen 
Purposes of public 
engagement 
Enlightenment 
model 
Program of economic 
development.  
Set of products with 
potential impacts 
An enlightened citizen 
gives an informed 
consent. 
Enlightening society, 
building trust in 
existing institutions. 
Critical inquiry 
model 
Symbol of unacceptable 
relationships between 
science, politics and the 
market.  
Program of control. 
A simple citizen 
exercises critical 
inquiry. 
Alienating, 
legitimizing. 
Constructivist 
model 
Set of projects with specific 
possibilities for 
intervention. 
An interested citizen 
participates actively in 
the construction of 
regulations and 
research orientations. 
Constructing a 
robust socio-
technical system. 
 
These three positions are clearly articulated by particular actors, for example, the mayor 
of Grenoble and the president of La Metro for the first, the most active members of 
PMO for the second and the Vivagora leaders for the latter. However it is important to 
notice that not all the actors involved have clear positions. For instance the elected 
officials do not speak from a unique position. Some of them state that engaging a 
dialogue with the public is necessary while articulating the official vision of public 
engagement, whereas others are far less convinced by the virtues of dialogue and would 
rather pursue local public investment policies without risking impeding it.  
 
A number of ecological groups, as Friends of the Earth, Greenpeace, or FRAPNA40, 
have got closer to PMO position about the framing of nanotechnology, without 
articulating the notion of critical enquiry41. Local leftist political parties such as ADES42 
                                                 
40  “Rhône-Alpes Federation for the Protection of Nature”, a local environmental group. 
41  PMO criticizes this late move toward its positions, presenting it as a use of the anti-
nanotechnology stance for the advancement of a particular agenda (e.g. the growth of a political group). 
This is another sign of PMO’s quest for interest-free positions to construct the public good. 
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have been focusing on the critique of the funding of private scientific and industrial 
initiatives with public money without necessarily embracing the opposition against 
nanotechnology as program of control. Similarly, STS vision of public engagement is 
not clear for many of the organizers of public engagement mechanisms. The 
Nanodialogue event is a good example. Albeit designed to “bring concerns back to the 
European Union”43, its role is uncertain for its organizer, the Centre de Communication 
Scientifique, Technique et Industrielle (CCSTI). Although the director of the CCSTI 
was also co-organizer of Nanoviv with Vivagora, he stressed the need for a better 
communication in Grenoble in a testimony before the Parliamentary Commission for 
the Evaluation of Scientific and Technical Choices (Office Parlementaire d’Evaluation 
des Choix Scientifiques et Techniques, 2005) that got close to the enlightenment vision 
of public engagement. Some officials adopt such complex attitudes, in which it seems 
that parts of discourses or practices of the same individual contradict each other, or at 
least can be interpreted differently. This would be analyzed as instrumentalism or 
cynicism by PMO, and described as ways to hide real interests - like social acceptability 
- by strategically adopting a certain posture. I would rather argue that such 
contradictions are signs of the uncertainties of the notion of public engagement for these 
actors themselves. 
Among those who feel these uncertainties about public engagement in Grenoble are the 
scientists. Most of them adopt the enlightenment model of public engagement when 
they comment upon the attempted mechanisms. When they participate in these 
mechanisms, they stress the need to “explain”, to “educate”, to “inform about objective 
risks”. Some of those who participated in the Nanoviv debate series criticized Vivagora 
                                                                                                                                               
42  “Association for Democracy, Ecology and Solidarity” 
43  Nanodialogue press release (www.ccsti-grenoble.org/download/CP_nanodialogue.pdf ) 
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of being “prejudiced against nanotechnology”44. However others are in favour of public 
debates about the meaning of their work. One of the Grenoble scientists in charge of the 
Nano2Life European network acknowledges their role, alongside ethical reflection, in 
making scientists reflecting upon their own work. However, he regrets that “the real 
issues are not discussed”45, like problems of access of new technologies, and, as many 
other scientists in Grenoble, does not see any direct link between his everyday work and 
public engagement as it has been led in Grenoble. Here again appears the uncertainty 
about the meaning of public engagement, as well as the poor connexion of participatory 
attempts made in Grenoble with the local scientific context. 
 
This paper has made clear that different visions of public engagement in 
nanotechnology can be articulated in the same context. It went further than the usual 
classification of motivations for public engagement (Fiorino, 1990) for three reasons. 
First, the visions presented here were based on an empirical study. Second, this paper 
presented the role of activists and showed that they articulate an extreme vision of 
public engagement as instrument of alienation. Third, these visions of public 
engagement were included in models of understanding of both nanotechnology issues 
and the role of the citizen in science and technology governance. 
The Grenoble example shows the variety of meanings and expectations granted to 
public engagement in nanotechnology. Through this analysis appear differences in ways 
of understanding nanotechnology and the role of the citizen in science policy. In 
particular, we saw that anti-nanotechnology activists are more than simply 
nanotechnology opponents. They propose a particular role for the citizen, which should 
lead him or her to illuminate power relationships not necessarily made clear. 
                                                 
44  Interview with a Grenoble scientist, January 12, 2007. 
45  Interview with the CEA representative of the Nanobio project, January 15, 2007. 
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Responding to activists’ criticisms was one of the main reasons for the Grenoble area 
administrations to sponsor public engagement mechanisms. As we saw, they will have 
probably no chance to satisfy PMO.  
This dynamics between Grenoble officials and activists is characterized by common 
features in the ways actors evaluate public engagement. In both the enlightenment 
model and the critical enquiry model, what matters is that the construction of the public 
good should be free from bias and interest. In coherence with the understanding of what 
the general interest is in France (Moody and Thevenot, 2000), neither activists nor 
officials would define the public good as something linked to a particular social group. 
When the connection is made, it is to criticize an attempt to corrupt the general interest. 
Scientists and officials see the public good as a product of scientific and economic 
rationality. For activists, the public good is gained through the respect of social 
categories and the independence from contestable interests.  
This common way of evaluating public engagement manifests itself clearly in a 
criticism made to Vivagora. As scientists, officials and activists say, this NGO “sells 
public debate”, it has particular economic interests in mind when it designed public 
debates and therefore cannot be entirely trustful46. The other part of the criticism of 
interests, which is formulated mostly by the activists, has to do with the nature of public 
engagement in the constructivist model. As it supposes that every actor recognizes its 
particular position and therefore its own interests, it does not follow the vision of 
necessary interest-free mechanism, and as such cannot be accepted by PMO. 
The little success of the constructivist model in Grenoble can be explained by 
fundamental disagreements about ways of evaluating public engagement. There have 
been misunderstandings with scientists and officials who for most of them are not aware 
                                                 
46  PMO formulated the same criticism about Pierre-Benoît Joly, who was described as a 
“mercenary”. 
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of what the agenda of the constructivist model implies47. On the contrary, PMO is well 
aware of the purposes of public engagement as described by STS48, and, as it does for 
the enlightenment model, rejects it while knowing what it would imply – the loss of the 
independent, free from interest position of the simple citizen. 
 
The methodology mobilized in this paper led to focus on the framing of public 
engagement, and, connected to it, of nanotechnology and citizenship. I did not consider 
“public engagement”, “nanotechnology” and “citizenship” as given, but I explored the 
dynamic processes through which these categories are constructed in discourses and 
practices. Therefore, my own position is by many respects close to the constructivist 
approach, and indeed, I regard positively the STS position on public engagement. That 
being said, this analysis makes clear that the implementation of the constructivist model 
is not straightforward. A first step to make STS vision of public engagement recognized 
by the other actors will be to understand what the competing visions of public 
engagement are in a particular context. This is necessary for STS scholars, not only to 
reflect upon their own positions on public engagement, but also to play an active role in 
science policy, either as advisors about public engagement or designers of participatory 
mechanisms. 
 
                                                 
47  Although some of them, like the Grenoble metropolitan area councillor for research and high 
education, include statements that are close to the constructivist model in otherwise enlightenment 
discourses. This is another example of the uncertainties of the notion of public engagement.  
48  Indeed, PMO leaders demonstrate an elaborate knowledge of the STS literature about public 
engagement. Numbers of PMO’s texts contains (critical) references to Callon et al. (2001), which is in 
France the main STS work related to public engagement. 
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